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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PIONEER FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

11133

DAHL RAY POWELL and
BONNIE RAE POWELL, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN
GENERAL
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FAILS TO OVERCOME THE DEFENSE AGAINST COLLECTION
OF THE POWELLS' NOTE AS THOSE DEFENSES ARE SET FORTH IN THEIR BRIEF
IN CHIEF.
The Powells' Brief in chief asserts four separate substantive law defenses against collection of
their note by Respondent, Pioneer. These are: ARGUMENT TWO, Fraud in the Inducement; ARGUMENT THREE, Failure of Pioneer to Act in Good
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2
Faith and Avoid Unconscionable Contracts; ARGU.
MENT FOUR, Failure of a Condition Precedent·
and ARGUMENT FIVE, Lack or Failure of Con:
sideration.
It is the Powells' hope that this Court will find
for them on all four grounds. However, a valid de.
fense against collection of the note by Pioneer is
stated in each of the foregoing substantive law de·
fenses or any combination of them.

The Powells' Brief in chief cites many cases
where courts found that buyers were not required
to repay money they had borrowed from finance com.
panies to purchase goods which the seller of the goods
failed to deliver to the buyer. In these cases, the
courts found that the finance companies were not
holders in due course, even though the paper had
been negotiated to them or purchased by them for
value because those courts also found that those
finance company claimants had been put on notice
of, or were implicated in a fraud being perpetrated
by the seller.
To assume that those cases are relevant here
only if this Court also finds Pioneer guilty of fraudu·
lent participation in Stanley's scheme widely misses
their legal impact. Such a finding of fraud on Pio·
neer's part is by no means necessary to make the
cited cases relevant to this case.
Pioneer is not a holder in due course. Pioneer
has the status of a "non-holder", not because of fraud
on its part, but simply because Pioneer is a "direct
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party" in the contract with the Powells. Pioneer is
not a purchaser for value, nor has the note on which
it sues been negotiated. Pioneer is not a holder in
due course by definition and as a matter of law.
This Court's decision in Scow v. Guardtone, 18
Utah 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 643 ( 1966) is illustrative
of cases where courts have deprived lenders of holder
in due course status by a finding of fraud or knowledge on their part. The Plaintiff in Scow, Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan, claimed to be an innocent
purchaser for value of Scow's conditional sale contract from Guardtone. Though a conditional sale
contract is not a negotiable instrument, yet by virtue
of Section 70A-9-206 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (or its predecessor in the NIL) an innocent
purchaser for value of a conditional sale contract is
clothed with substantially all the attributes of a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.
There was no question in Scow whether Guardtone delivered the goods to Scow nor whether Prudential was a purchaser for value of the Scow contract. The nub of the question posed to this Court
in Scow seems to have been whether Prudential was
"innocent." For the various reasons cited in that
opinion, this Court found that Prudential was sufficiently careless or involved in Guardtone's fraud as
to strip of its "innocent" purchaser status.
Once this Court had decided Prudential was not
entitled to the extraordinary protection provided for
an innocent purchaser, the result was that Pruden-
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tial could not prevail in its collection suit against
Scow, however, no finding of knowledge or fraud
on the part of Pioneer is needed in this case to con.
fer on the Powells all of the legal defenses here asserted by them as provided by the rules of ordinary
contract law.
The lack of understanding of the cases cit€d
in the Powells' brief in chief is illustrated by Respondent's Brief where at page 13 it states:
"Defendants' cases cited in their brief such as
Commercial Credit Corp. vs. Orange County
Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d819,
and Mutual Finance Company vs. Martin, 63
So. 2d 649, 44 ALR 2d 1, are not pertinent to
the instant matter. In those cases the financing institution was found to have participated
in the transaction (the sale) to the extent that
the court held they were not a holder in due '
course of the paper which they purchased."
Respondent fails to make the further inevitable
legal conclusion that since the finance companies
in the above cases were found not to be holders in
due course (because of their fraudulent participa·
tion) those finance companies were thereby placed
in the same boat in which Pioneer now finds itseli
because Pioneer also is not a holder in due course by
definition.
Respondent's brief at page 14 states:
"In cases where contracts or notes have been
sold or assigned, the courts have held t~at thde
financing institution must have acted m ba .
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faith in order that the defense of failure of
consideration or of fraud in the inducement
prevail against them." [emphasis added]
We agree. Where instruments have been sold
or assigned, fraud or bad faith must be found to
deprive note owners of the special protection provided
for holders in due course, against the defenses of
failure of a condition precedent, or failure of consideration.
In the course of making its argument that estoppel should be invoked against the Appellants, Respondent cites Thorp Finance Company v. LeMire,
264 Wis 220, 58 NvV 2d 641, 44 ALR 2d 189 ( 1953)
as authority for the proposition that since the debtors
signed a paper acknowledging that the merchandise
promised by the seller was already in the buyers' possession, the buyers were es topped to assert failure of
consideration to defend against the finance company
suit on its note. This interpretation of LeMire seems
to be at variance with what the Wisconsin Supreme
Court actually said at 44 ALR 2d 195:

"The trial court made a statement in the record after counsel for the plaintiff had moved
for a directed verdict explaining the court's
reasons for granting such a motion. In such
statement the trial court declared that it would
be a violation of the parol evidence rule to
permit LeMire to prove that the furniture being purchased by him from Stoltz had never
been delivered when the contract itself recited
such delivery. [emphasis added]
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"The learned trial court was in error in his
conclusion that the parol evidence rule would
preclude LeMire from proving the non-deliv.
ery of the furniture ... "
Pioneer even admits at page 20 of its Brief that
"it is unlikely that Plaintiff relied on the literal
language" of the Chattel Mortgage to the effect that
the furniture was in possession of the Powells, but
asserts it did rely on representations that the loan
was to purchase the furniture on Stanley's list. What
did happen? Pioneer's check was endorsed by Mr..
Powell and delivered to Stanley's agent in Pioneer's
office in the presence of Pioneer's personnel (see Def.
Dep. p. 17-18) to pay for the furniture on Stanley's
list, which furniture was also listed on the Chattel
Mortgage. Also at page 13 of its brief, Pioneer states
that the check was made payable to Stanley "to in· ,
sure that the funds were actually used for the in·
tended purpose." Pioneer cannot now assert it did not
intend to have Stanley receive their check.
Respondent seems to feel its position is strength·
ened if it can establish that Stanley's promise to de·
liver the furniture was somehow in the "indefinite
future" (Respondnt's Brief, p. 6). That the Powells
expected the furniture to be delivered immediately
after they delivered Pioneer's check to him is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that they made numerous
requests for the furniture (Def. Dep. p. 25) during
the six or seven week period which intervened be·
tween signing the note and posting of the bankrupt·
cy notices on the Stanley Furniture Company door.
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In view of all the legal and equitable circumstances involved in this case, Appellant vigorously
resists Respondent's request for attorney's fees on
this Appeal and on the contrary, asks that their own
be paid by the Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF TO RESPONDENT'S
CROSS-APPEAL
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENT HAD FAILED
TO STATE A CLAIM OF FRAUD AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS WHICH W 0 UL D BAR DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT.
Section 17 (b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act [11
U.S.C. 35 (a)] provides that a discharge in bankruptcy will release a bankrupt from all his provable debts except such debts as:
" ( 2) are liabilities for obtaining money or
property by false pretenses or false representations or obtaining credit upon a materially
false statement respecting his financial condition or caused to be made or published in
any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive ... " [emphasis added]
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this
section of the Bankruptcy Act in Gleason v. Thaw
236 US 558, 35 S Ct 287, 59 Led 717, which is also
quoted at 133 ALR 436 stating as follows:
". . . It does not except from discharge debts
created by obtaining credit through concealment of insolvency and present inability to
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pay. It excepts from discharge 'Liabilities for
obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations.' Within the meaning of that statute then, there were no false
pretenses, no false representations here. There
was merely the obtaining of credit witho1lt
full disclosure, with the knowledge that if full
disclosure had b(en required, credit might well
not have been given, but that was all. A remedial statute, like that of bankruptcy intended
for the relief of debtors, must, insofar as
denial of discharges and therefore of relief
be construed strictly so that all debts except ,
those coming exactly within the exception will
stand discharged.'' [emphasis added]
In an annotation titled "What constitutes false
representations in application for loan within provision of Bankruptcy Act rendering liability for obtaining money by false pretenses or representations non- :
dischargeable" the following summary statement will
be found at 17 ALR 2d 1209:
"The reported decisions make it clear that, if

§ 35 of the Bankruptcy Act is to prevent a

bankrupt's discharge from liability for a loan,
the latter must be shown to have secured the
loan by false representations of such character
as to meet the judicial requirements for legal
fraud - that is, the bankrupt's represent~
tions must have been material and false JD
fact must have been made with an intent to
dec~ive and defraud, and the creditor must
have believed, acted, and relied upon them to
its prejudice. The representation must be of
an existing fact or circumstance, not merely a
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9
promise or statement of intention ... " [emphasis added]
In amplification of the elements which must
be proved in Utah to constitute the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses [76-20-8 UCA
(1953)] this Court in State v. Timmerman 88 U
481, 478, 55 P 2d 1320, 56 P 2d 1354 lays down the
following rules of proof which are required:
"Under this section [76-20-8 U CA] the following elements and proof of them must concur, viz. : ( 1) There must have been false or
fraudulent representations or pretenses; (2)
the representations must have been made
knowingly and designedly; (3) there must
have been a concurring intent to cheat or defraud the person to whom the false or fraudulent representations or pretenses were made;
( 4) something of value must have been obtained because of the false or fraudulent representations or pretenses; and ( 5) the party
to whom the false or fraudulent representations or pretenses were made must have parted
with something of value in reliance upon the
false or fraudulent representations or pretenses, believing them to be true." [emphasis
added]
Pioneer makes much in its Brief and Cross Appeal of a play on words to the effect that the Appellants deceived the Respondent in that the Powells
represented to Pioneer that they were borrowing
money in the amount shown on Stanley's handwritten
list to pay for the furniture on that same handwrit-
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ten list when in fact, according to Pioneer, the
Powells really only "loaned" the money to Stanley
on Stanley's promise to give them "free" the furniture he listed.
While Pioneer's Brief recites some indication
from the deposition that there was some confusion,
particularly in the mind of Mrs. Powell as to the
difference between buying and paying for furniture
and lending money in return for getting furniture
"free," further reading of the deposition leaves no
doubt that Mr. Powell thought he was borrowing the '
money from Pioneer to buy the furniture on Stanley's
list.
Pioneer's Brief at page 7 recites the following
answer given by Mr. Powell:
"A. Well, the way he [Stanley] told us thathe
was borrowing money on our credit and in
return he was giving us the furniture for him
lending us his credit or him using our credit."
If the questions and answers immediately fol·
lowing the foregoing (Def. Dep. p. 26) had also been
quoted, additional light would have been shed on
Mr. Powell's understanding of the transaction:

"Q. You didn't really feel like you were buying
furniture?
"A. Yes, we thought we were buying furni·
ture.
"Q. And what did you expect to do in the even~
Stanley wasn't able to pay for the furniture.
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"A. Well, I figured we would pay for the
furniture as long as we had the furniture if
he didn't make the payments. [The Powells'
intention to pay if Stanley failed to pay is
also asserted in their Deposition on page 38.]
"Q. So it would be correct to say that you
thought you were purchasing furniture?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And that in any event if Stanley could
not make the payments you intended to make
the payments?
"A. Yes, that's right.

"Q. Did it ever occur to you that maybe Stanley might not deliver the furniture to you?
"A. No, it didn't. We was going mostly by our
friend. [David Hunt] He was the one that got
us in on the deal and I knew him all my life
and trusted him and he had received his furniture and Stanley had made all the payments
on it and if Stanley had come up on the street
and told me of such a deal I wouldn't have
gone for it but where my friend got me into
it I fell for it."
Mrs. Powell also seemed to consider she was
borrowing the money to pay for the furniture on
Stanley's list as shown by the following exchange
(Def. Dep. p. 37) :

"Q. Mrs. Powell, it was your understanding,
was it, that you were buying furniture from
Mr. Stanley?
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"A. We was receiving some furniture, yes.
"Q. And that you were borrowing money from
the finance company to pay for that furni.
ture?
"A. Yes, and that he would be making the
payments."
That there was no intention on the part of the
Powells to defraud Pioneer is further made clear by
the fact that they paid over to Pioneer the money for
a payment they received from Stanley. It seems un- .
likely they would have paid over his money if they ·
had intended to defraud Pioneer. Their lack of intention to defraud is further made clear by the
fact that in their deposition the Powells reaffirmed
the truthfulness of the financial statement they submitted to Pioneer and on which Pioneer relied in
making the loan.
Much is made of the fact that the Powells failed
to tell Pioneer about Stanley's promise to make the
payments. Though the Powells did not know why
Stanley advised them not to tell Pioneer they cer·
tainly did not think their failure to tell of Stanley's
program was in any way fraudulent or harmful to
Pioneer.
At page 10 of the Powells' Deposition the fol·
lowing colloquy between Mr. Swan and Mr. Powell
will be found:
"Q. Did you feel at this time that there w~s
anything morally wrong or illegal about this
deal?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
"A. Well, No.
"Q. You felt if someone would pay off this
note and chattel mortgage and you can get
free furniture for it, why no one's hurt, is
that right?
"A. Right."

In the colloquy which then ensued, it developed
that Mr. Powell had made numerous loans from finance companies, and that he was familiar with procedures and the time usually required for him to
secure a loan. At page 20 of his deposition, Mr.
Powell states:
"Q. So you were pretty well familiar with their

procedure?
"A. Yes.

"Q. And it is on that basis that you say this
loan went through in a shorter span of time?
"A. Yes. Before we have went to a finance
company and filled out information and we
have had to wait a day or so before they would
tell us whether our loan was 0.K. before we
even went there."

In Defendants' Deposition p. 32, Mrs. Powell
clearly states that she thought the finance company
already knew about Stanley's arrangement:

"Q. (By Mr. Swan) When he [Stanley] cautioned you that way did that bother you?
"A. Yes, it did.
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"Q. Up to that point had you assumed that he
and th~ finance company knew exactly what
wasgomgon?
"A. I think they did.
"Q. After that time did you begin to wonder if
the finance company knew exactly what was
.
?
gomgon.
"A. Well, like my husband said, that was the
shortest loan we have ever had taken out because others, they have really checked us but
this one they didn't to our knowledge.
"Q. At the one time he said to you 'Don't tell
the finance company that I am making the
payments,' wasn't that a red flag to you that
the finance company didn't have the whole
story?
"A. Well, yes, but on the other hand our friend
[David Hunt] said that some finance companies did know what was going on. He didn't
name any finance companies specifically but
he said there was some of them that did know."
Actually, the Powells made no false representations or pretenses to the Respondent. It is true that
they did not discuss the fact that they intended to ,
receive money from Stanley to make the payments
but the law seems clear that merely failure to disclose information which is not asked for cannot constitute a false pretense or representation except pr,rhaps in a fiduciary relationship. It seems clear also
from the pleadings, the Affidavit of Pioneer's Man·
ager, and from the Deposition, that Respondent re·
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lied in rnakin,g the loan on the written and oral credit
information supplied by the Appellants, the truth
of which credit information was reasserted in the
Depositions and has never been challenged by Pioneer. Respondent cannot now be sustained in its
assertion that it relied in making the loan on Appellants' failure to advise them that Stanley had agreed
to supply the funds for the payments.

The simple fact is that Pioneer bargained for
and received a note signed by the Powells in reliance
on the Powells' credit statement, but since Pioneer
is not a holder in due course, failure of Stanley to
deliver the furniture is a defense under contract law
against Pioneer's collection of the Note. Pioneer cannot now cure its legal inability to collect on the note
by the cry of "fraud" where none exists.
STEW ART, TOPHAM
&HARDING
714 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys at Law
JUSTIN C. STEWART
714 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Appellants
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